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Come now United States Smelting Refining and 
Mining Company and Combined Metals Reduction Com-
2 
pany, the Plaintiffs and Respondents respectively named 
in the above-entitled cases and pursuant to Order of 
this Court authorizing Petitioners to file a consolidated 
Petition therein, petition the Court for a rehearing in 
the above entitled cause::o. 
Your Petitioners ret:ipectfully repre::oent that the 
Court in it::o Opinion, erred in the following particulars: 
1. Ln so construing Section 80-6-37 a::o to render 
the net procee<ls method of valuation unreasonable, in-
equitable and violative of the constitutional require-
ment of uniformity. 
2. In disregarding material fact::-; stipulated to be-
tween the parties. 
;). In disregarding Section 81-1-1, Utah Code An-
notated 1D4:3, which defines a sal<~ and thereby nece::osarily 
limits the meaning of the phrase ''gross proceeds re-
alilled '" '' * from the ::oale ., * ., to the consideration for 
which tl1e tran::ofer of property is made, which considera-
tion is called 'the price.' '' 
4. ln ignoring Section 80-3-1 defining "value" as: 
"(5) 'Value' and 'full cash value' mean the 
amount at which the property would be taken 
in payment of a just debt due from a solvent 
debtor." 
and thereby reaching a conclusion necessarily implying 
that the less vaiuable a property, the greater the amount 
at which it would be taken in payment of a just debt from 
a solvent debtor. 
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WIU~HJ1~FOHJ1J, H(~tipondcnts pray that this petition 
he granted anJ that upon rehearing the decision of this 
Court heretofore made and entered be vacated and that 
the dcei~ion ol' the trial eourt he affirmed. 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION 
FOR REHEARING 
l1'or convenience and particularly in view of the 
time tlmt has elapsed tiincc the original hearing, we 
shall make a brief restatement of the relevant fads. 
rrllese actions involve the construction to be placed 
upon Section 80-5-57, Utah Code Annotated 1943, rela-
tive to determining the base for valuation of metalli-
ferous mines for a(l valorem tax purposes. As far as 
pertinent here, Section 80-5-5G, U.C.A. UJ43, reads as 
follows: 
''All metalliferous mines and mining claims, 
both placer and rock in place, shall be assessed 
$5.00 per acre and in addition thereto at a value 
equal to two times the net annual proceeds there-
of for the caltmdar year next preceding * ~, *.'' 
Section 80-5-57 defines the phrase, ''net annual pro-
ceeds,'' and provides in part: 
"The words 'net annual proceeds' of a metal-
liferous mine or mining claim arc defined to 
be the gross proceeds realized during the pre-
ceJing calendar year from the sale or conversion 
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into money or it1i equivalent of all ores from 
such mine or mining claim extracted by the owner 
or le1isee, contractor or other person working 
upon or operating the property, including all 
dumps and tailings, during or previous to the 
year for which the assessment is made, less the 
following and no other, deduction: * * * '' 
In fixing the valuation of the mines involved for 
general tax purpo1Ses for the year 194i3, the defendants 
and appellants included in the tax base and as a part 
of the '' gro1is proceeds realized during the prec·eding 
calendar year from the sale or conversion into money 
or its equivalent"-of the ores from 1iuch mines the 
subsidy payments received hy the mining companies 
from the Federal Government for production of copper, 
lead and r,inc in excess of quotas fixed by the War Pro-
duction Board and the Office of Price Administration. 
It is stipulated that these sub1iidies were paid to 
encourage additional production and to make pos1iible 
the extraction of submarginal ores and to pay the in-
creased costs incident to such extraction. 
Jt is stipulated that the subsidies received by re-
spondents were not received at the time of sale or dis-
posal of the ores and metals nor were they received from 
the purchaser1; thereof. They were received sometimes 
before sale to the purchaser and sometimes subsequently 
thereto. They were not a part of or in any manner re-
fleeted in or related to any sale or any consideration for 
a sale or conversion into money of the ores or metals. 
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The appellants, purporting to act under the statutes 
above rel'(_~rred to, added to the sums received by re-
spondents [rom the sale of their ores and metals during 
the year HJ..J-:~, the amount of the subsidy payments re-
ceived hy respondents from the Federal Government 
aml levied a tax thereon amounting in each case to the 
sum prayed for in the complaint. These amounts are 
in no manner disputed in the record. 
'J'he trial court found the issues m favor of the 
plaintiffs and respondents and rendered judgment ac-
conlingly. This court on appeal, by a divided opinion, 
reversed the trial court and held that the subsidy pay-
ments received by respondents from the Federal Govern-
ment were properly includable in the tax base. 
lt is with respect to this decision and conclusion 
that petitioners pray for a rehearing and point out that 
the eourt erred with regard to material stipulated facts 
and the application of the controlling statutes thereto. 
~We shall discuss the points raised in the order 
in which they are set out in the petition for rehearing. 
Heference herein will be made to the record in cause 
No. 6~J:n, United States Smelting, Refining and Mining 
Company vs. Phares Haynes as County Treasurer of 
Tooele County, a legal subdivision of the State of Utah. 
ARGUMENT 
1. The Court erred in so construing Section 80-5-57 
as to include "premium payments" in "net proceeds," 
thereby rendering such section as so construed unreason-
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abl(', ineqnita!Jie and violative of the Constitutional re-
<{nirement ol' uniformity of taxation. 
'l'he Court conedly states in its Opinion m Case 
No. G!J:n that: 
"The matter involv<~d in this ease is not 
Ute priec received from eopper, lead or "'iue; it 
is not the quantity ol" ore mined nor the eost of 
mining same; it is not the c1uotas fixed by the 
government, nor the reasons for such <1uotas. 
The oul,t; matter incolrcr/ is the ralualion for 
assessliteut }Jitrposes of' the Mine on .JanlW1',1J +, 
1!!44." 
'l'he Court states m its opmwn t!tat J>n;mium Pa!J-
ments were, 
· · rlesigned lo encourar;c and nwkc possible the 
JJt.ininr;, c..rtraction and refinin,r; of suu-uwrrrinal 
orcs ?t•hir:h ot/u;rwise u.·ould not be · pa,1; dirt.· '' 
'l'o iuelude payments made for such purlJose in gross 
proceeds is nceessaril.v to hold that the greater the costs 
of produetion the more valuable a mine. No member of 
this Honorable Court, notwithstanrhnr; the Opinion of 
tl1e Court in these cases, u·ould pay as much for a ·mine 
1rltic!t could only produce with the aid iof a b·onus as 
he would pay for a 1nine which cmtld operate at a profit 
'Without such bonus. 
As the Court stated above, 
·'the only nwtter involved here is the valu.ation 
for assessment purposes of the mine on JanUIU,IJ 
-1-, uq4.'' 
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Tlmt is not priumrily a legal problem but a practical 
problf,~!ll whi<~h dou!JtlL~~s an invesilnent banker, a mine 
engineer or anyone else familiar with the business of 
mining would he better qualil'ied to determine than would 
th<' most expert lawy<~r unacquainted -with mine invL~st­
menl~; awl valuationR. 
'l'he legal problem whidt tltis Court is ealled upon 
to detL~nnine is whether the statutes implementing the 
Constitutional re<1uirements as to uniformity of asRess-
ment and taxation contemplate that premium payments 
sltonld ht~ indn<le<l in nd proceeds for the purpose of 
ddenuining the value of a mine and >vhether, in such 
event, the stalntes do or do not violate such Constitu-
tional provisions. 
'l'he Constitution requires that all tangible property 
in the State not exempt, 
'' :ohall he taxed in proportion to its value, to be 
aseertained as provided hy law;'' 
and that 
'"!'he Legi:olature :ohall provide by law a uniform 
and equal rate ol" as~;cssment and taxation on all 
tangible property in the State aecording to it:o 
value in money and ::;hall prescribe hy law such 
regulation::; as Rhall secure a just valuation for 
taxation of :ouch property so that every pcr:oon 
and coqJOration shall pay a tax in proportion to 
the value of his, Iter or its tangihlc property." 
Seelion 80-5-57 must be read in the light of the fact 
so well exprc~sc<l hy this Court when it said: 
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''the only matter im:ol,ved here is tlw val1uzlion for 
assessment purposes of the mine on January 4, 
1944.'' 
When the Legislature enacted that statute it must 
be assumed that it intended to lay down a practical 
formula for arriving at the value of mines. 
'l'he statute provides for the assessment of mines on 
the basis of a multiple of net proceeds. That basis has 
been n~cognized as a proper basis for the valuation 
of mines. The measure of value so specified had, as this 
Court stated in Tintic Standard Mining Co. v. Utah 
County, ct al. 80 Utah 4~1, 15 P. (2d) 633, attained a 
definite and well understood meaning when the 1918 
Constitutional Amendment was adopted. 
vVhat that "well understood meaning" was, IS not 
in doubt. 
As 1\lr. Justice Wolfe, in his concurring Opinion in 
the consolidated case of Combined Metals Reduction Co. 
et al. 1:. State Tax Gouuniss£on, 176 J>. (2d) G14, said: 
"Undoubtedly the Legislature, at the time of 
the passage of the Occupation 'rax Law, did not 
envisage a war, consequent price ceilings and 
premium prices. It intended to impose a tax 
on the privilege of mining ore, and it made the 
measure of that tax a smn equal to l% of the 
gross amount recnived for or 1% of the 
value of tlw metalliferous ore sold. It may and 
•probabl.IJ did ltw'e in mind that the mcasune of 
fhe rah.tP of the ore 1{·ould be u:lmt was .rcceiped 
directly from the smelter in a bona fide salP lJc-
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uwse it enrisaged that as the ttsttal situwtion ·in 
!course of trade and did not tl1ink in term,,-;J iof a 
consideration from another source.'' 
Tlte Oeeupation 'l'ax Ad wm; enacted. in 1D37 so it 
<"annot bt~ <ptes tioned thai the Legislature, when enacting 
tlw N d Proceeds Law long prior thereto, equally did 
Hot have iu mind a situation such as that with wllieh we 
are now confronted. 
Under the meaning of "net proceeds" as und<~r­
stood until this Honorable (;ourt spoke in this case and 
in the Occupation 'l'ax cases, the measure of the value 
of a mine related to its economic production and the same 
factors applied to all mines. 'l'here was such uniformity 
as is reasonably possible. 
'!'hen there was taken into consideration what a 
mine produced, what it cost to produce it and what 
it realized from the production and on that basis the 
taxing authorities, just like a prospective investor or 
any one seeking with ordinary common sense to value 
a mine, arrived at an estimate of value. 
1\ ow for the first time and admittedly by doing 
something the Legislature did not contemplate, it is pro-
posed to inject into the statutory formula for the valua-
tion of a mine a factor which is not only not reasonably 
ealculated to determine value, but which is directly op-
pot-Oed to the other factors therein. 
'l'o say that a mine may be valued by including a 
payment made to encourage the production of ore which 
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coul<l not otherwise be econmuically produced is to say 
what is obviously opposed to common sense, to assert 
something on which no one would knowingly ad in his 
own interest. 
To take an illustration: Here are two mines. ln the 
year 1D4:J they produced the same quantity of ore. One 
of them was able to produce that ore ami to sell it at 
ceiling prices and mah:e a profii. The other was unable 
to do so but on the contrary would not have been able 
to produce except that it was paid by Government a 
bonus to make possible the production of its sub-marginal 
ores. 'l'he total number of dollars received by the first 
mine from the sale of its ores just e<1ualled the total 
number of dollars received by the second mine from the 
sale of its ores plus the premiums or bonus paid it hy 
Government. 
1f Government was committed forever to continue 
such payments it is conceivable that someone might say 
that the two mines were of equal value because irrespec-
tive of source one returned to its owners as many dollars 
m a given year as did the other. 
But as the record shows, no such situation existed. 
On the contrary, in a war emergency and for a limited 
period Government agreed to pay a bonus to encourage 
production of ores which could not otherwise be pro-
duced. 
\Vould any man say that these two mmes were of 
the same value 1 
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\V c suhmit that no one would mal::c such a statement 
and that thi:,; Court in holding that premium payments 
W(~re a part of net proceeds was inadvertently led into 
the (~rror of in effect holding that the two mines were of 
equal valne. 
If the statute was to he construed as including pre-
mium payment:,;, then obviously it would violate the Con-
stitutional re<1uircment of uniformity since it would re-
snlt in imposing el]_ual taxes upon properties of uneqtucl 
value. 
\V c submit that no reason exists for so construing 
Seetion 80-5-57 and that in order so to construe such 
section this Court is obliged not only to ignore what it 
states has for many years been the well recognized mean-
ing of the phrase, "net proceeds," but also to read into 
the statute something which obviously and as pointed 
out hy .T ustice \Volfe, was not within the contemplation 
of the Legislature and something which destroys the 
very hasis upon which net proceeds valuation has become 
accepted as a reasonable method of arriving at the value 
of a rnme. 
As the Supreme Court of the United States said in 
United States v. Cooper Corporation, et al. 312 U. S. 600, 
85 L. ed 1071: 
"But it is not our function to engraft on a 
statute additions which \Ve think the Legislature 
logicaJly might or should have made.'' 
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Had tho Legi:slature of Utah, when in 1919 it do-
fined "net proceeds" contemplated that some day Gov-
ermuent would pay a bonus to encourage or make pos-
sible the production of sub-marginal ore:s, it doubtles:s 
would have taken account of :such fact, hut had it done :so 
it llJOst eedainly woulJ have proided not that sneh pre-
miums should he incluJed in net proceeds, hut that they 
should he oxeludeJ therefrom. \Ve say this with confi-
dence for the reason that tho purpose of tlw Legislature 
\vas to provide a practical, rational method for valuing a 
mine and this it obviom;ly could not do by including a 
factor evidencing a lack of value with factors going to 
make value. 
This Honorable Court has said that it is its duty in 
construing and interpreting legislative acts to give effect 
to tl1o intent of tho Legislature and to avoid an inter-
pretation whieh would lead to an impractical, unfair 
or unreasonable result. Non:illc v. State Ta:l' Comli!is-
silonJ !JS Utah 70, m P. (2d) 937. 
This Court has likewise stated that it is required to 
give words used their ordinary and natural meaning and 
that unless tho contrary appears, the terms of legi:sla-
tive enactments must be taken in their ordinary and 
usual signifieance, as they are generally understood 
among mankind. SaU Lake Union Stock Yards v. State 
Tnx Commission of Utah, ~)3 Utah 166, 71 P. (2d) 5:)8; 
J,_'uuncrt:oon 'O. State TaJ; Commission, ~J3 Utah 219, 72 
P. (2d) 467. 
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Appellants have pointed to nothing in the language 
oi' the statute or in the history of mine taxation in Utah 
\\ltjc·ll would warrant any departure from the rule so 
lnid down by this Court. 
Tlte valLw ol.' a mine, like any other property, is 
nteasured by its ability to earn a profit. 'l'he higher the 
('('~;h; u1' production, the less the ability to earn a profit. 
'J'o indude p1 emium payments made to a mine to weet 
(':\('Cs::; eo::;t::; of produetion,-to make post5ible the mining 
ol' ::;uh-marginal ores-wl1ieh a::; thit; Court has ::;aid, 
"otherwi::;e would not be 'pay dirt'.'' 
a~; though such payments represented profit::; derived 
from operation, it5 simply to ignore the obvious facts and 
to a::;sert that tho more it costs to produce ore the greater 
tl•e value of the mine. 
l'~veu were it IJOI:it5ible to ignore the fact that pre-
miuuit5 were paid to make pot5sible production and wore 
nu pal't of nul proceeds as that term has been uniformly 
under::;tood for many, many years, still premiums could 
not he included in measuring the value of a mine without 
violating the Con::;titutional requirement of uniformity, 
-thi::; J'or the rea::;on that, as the record shows, initial 
quotas were based upon production in 1941 and premiums 
paid under (A) (1uotas determined upon excess produc-
tion in 1!)4:3 over production in lD41. Consequently two 
lllines producing equal (1uantities of ore at identical 
eo::;ts in l!J4:~ would, if premium payments were to be 
inrlnded, have different values depending not at all upon 
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what happened in 1!)43, but upon what had happened 
in 1!)41. lt ito no answer to say that uniformity requires 
Hwrely that the t-lallle mle be applied to all. As tl1is Hon-
orable Conrt l-itated in its opinion, 
"Dut the different formulae which may be 
applied to different bnds of property must he 
tom:h that they aim an<l tend to Sl~cure for a:,;scss-
ment purposes a valuation fair and equitable in 
comparison with and eonnuemmrate with the valu-
ation of other kin<ls of property." 
If produetion in a given year, less certain statutory 
deduetions, affords a fair measure for valuing a mine in 
eomparison with other clatoses of property, then it must 
be because experience has demonstrated this to be a faet, 
but this contemplates that value be determined by what 
happens in a given year and not by what ha(l happened in 
some other year. When it is attempted to include as a 
factor an event in past history, then equality is lost. vV e 
submit thi8 is too obvious to exeuse further comment. 
2. The Court erred in disregarding material faets 
stipulated to between the parties. 
The Court in its opinion said: 
"vVe conclude that 'the gross proceeds rea-
lized' as used in this seetion of the statute (Sec-
tion 80-5-57) means the total or whole amount in 
money or other things of value that has been 
received or which the owner may receive or take 
possession of at his plea8ure or to which he is 
entitled on demand and which accrues to him from 
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tliP salP or convcrsi,on i:nto money or its crjuivalenl 
of ores extracted from the mine or mining 
claim;,;." 
\\' l' do not ];now why the Court referred in the alter-
natin• to sale or eonversion into money or its equivalent, 
sinee the Court in its opinion, and speaking of the pre-
lllllllll payments, says: 
''Are they moneys received from a sale of 
ores or metals 'I These orcs or metals belonged, 
aurl as far as the record shows still belong to the 
m'iner.'' 
Certainly the Court does not propose to go beyond 
the record and as the Court says, the record doe;,; not 
show any ::;ale. Ho far as the opinion contains any ex-
planation of this, it appears to lie in the statement not 
supported hy the record that, 
''Hut if the fact be that these ores or metals ex-
tracted therefrom were or have been sold, then 
under our <leeision in Combined Metals v. Tax 
Commission, No. G8G!), just decided '" * * these 
payments would constitute part of the proceeds 
received from a sale and properly be a part of the 
gross proceeds realized.'' 
Following this the Court said: 
"It follows that whether the metals have been 
sold or retained by the miner, the premium pay-
ments are part of the gross proceeds realized from 
ores extracted from the mine and are to be in-
cluded in computing the tax base or valuation of 
the mine for tax purposes.'' 
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T'lH~ Court fudlwr ~ay~: 
"Preminm payments apply only to ores 
ship1Jed :o the smelter or rc<lnction works. They 
arc wade on the basis of the determined metal 
eontent of the preeipitates an<l eoneentrates de-
l ivcrcd to the smelting company.'' 
and then in eontradietion to this the Court says: 
"ln other words, the premium payments an~ made 
only on and when the orcs extracted from the 
mine are converted into eoneentrates or bullion 
~where the quantity of the various metah; is readily 
determinable and the value thereof easily com-
putable. vVhen the extracted ores have been con-
verted or refined into metals in such form that 
they have a ready market at definite or readily 
dettmninable prices so that at any time the miner 
can dispose of them and receive the money there-
for, they have been converted into the equivalent 
of money, and arc to be included in the computa-
tion of gross proceeds for the purpose of fixing 
valuation or tax base.'' 
and again: 
''There can be no question but that these pre-
mium payments accrue to the miner from the 
converting, or rendering, into a marketable eonrli-
tion (the equivalent of money) of ores extracted 
from the mine.'' 
These statements contradict the following stipulated 
facts: 
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It wm; stipulated that the affidavit set out at R. p. 
4H, is a eopy of that submitted by Petitioner, United 
Ntat(~S NHJelting Hefining and .Mining Company, as a 
ha~is for payments to it. That :,;tatement :,;how:,; that the 
quantity ol' copper, lead and zinc daimed as a basis for 
}H'Pllli tllll payments represented ''mine pr:oduction faT 
11/0ntli s/a1ied as shown by mtT books and TecoTds." 
1t was stipulated that: 
· · PTemiu,m payments aTe Teceived by United 
f:Jtntes Smelting Refining and Mining Company 
on the basis of monthly affidavits showing the 
production ·acoording •to the company's records 
from :~0 to !)() days before the recoverable m.et.(Lls 
are available for sale." ( R p. 51) 
In order to hold that premium payments were re-
ceived on a sale, it was nece:,;:,;ary for the Court to find 
eitller (in disregard of the record as the court states 
it to he) that there had been a sale, or to find in disre-
gard of the above :,;tipulated facts, that the ores had 
been conerted m· refined into metals in such form that 
tltP_\' have a ready market at definite or readily de-
tenninahle IJrices. Salt Lake County 1i. Utah Copper 
('oiii]Hmy, !);l !:<'. (2d) 127. 
( )hviously payments made 30 to 90 days before the 
J'('('OverahlP metals arc available for sale, payments based 
on mine• produetion records, were neither payments made 
on a sal(•, nor payments made when the orcs had be(m 
convPrt(•d o1· refim~d into metals in such form tlmt the;c 
liavt• a l'Pad~c market at definite or readily dctenninable 
18 
pri<·(~:i so ihat at any time tiH~ miner can dispose of them 
and n:~eein~ the money therefor. rl'hey are not payments 
Ewde when the ores have been "converted into tht• equiv-
ah~nt ol' nwnc~·. ·.· 
In the Salt Lake County v. Utah Copper Company 
vase uhove refene<l lo, it v;m; not sought to indude in m~t 
p•·oePc>(h; <·oneentrates ot untreated ores, but solely to 
inelude blister copper with respect to whiel1 the courh; 
said: 
''Blister copper hm; an established and rea<li-
l.•; ascertainable market value all<l when the tax-
ing authorities were apprised of the muuber of 
pounds produced it was a simple matter to ap-
praise its value in money." 
'l'l1e record here shows that Utah Copper Company 
(now Kennecott Copper Corporation) is paid premiums 
not when its ores have been refined into blister copper 
hul on the basis of the determined metal content of the 
precipitates all<l concentrates delivered to American 
f-lnwlting and Hefining Company and that the metals 
recovered from such precipitates and concentrates or-
dinarily h~~eome available for marketing approximately 
three months after their delivery to the smelter. R p. GO. 
United States Smelting Refining and Mining Com-
pany processes most of the ores produced at its own 
properties at its mill and smelter at Midvale, Utah and 
the resulting products arc shipped out of the state for 
further processing to refined metal. R. p. 51. 
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Y l't tile pn~tmum paylllents are made to United 
~tatl':-' ~-lltldting l\eJ'ininf!; awl l\lining Company on the 
lmtii~ of its wine prociudion records l'or a stated ltlOllth 
nJJd l'nJill ;;o to !JO days befon~ the recoverable metals an; 
m <: i b !Jle l"or sall~. 
ln ul(~ l'aee ol' these stijmlated facts\\'(~ snbltlit it is 
lJt'yon.i qw•stiml that th<; Court ened in holding that the 
Jll'l'lllilllll jJayEwntt> acenw to Uw winer frulll the eon-
n~l"tin~~· int,J a marketable eondition (the e<1uivalcmt of 
wom'!) oL ores extracted from tile wine. 
The l'ads as stipulated and shown by the reeord 
wen• <'<J!Tedly stated by the Court when it said: 
"'I' hey (premium payments) were paid to the 
produc:el' !Jy the llletalt-; nesel Vl~ Cowpany month-
1:· ~tpon c~edil'ieatc~t'l l'rmn the~ suwl tc•r showing the 
qmllltity ,,( tlw various metal~: o\·<~r the assigrwd 
quota dc·liYered to illP ~mc•lter i row the mine." 
'!'he~ Court lil,cwise eorredly stated the facts as 
stipulat<~d in the rceonl when it said: 
"11'inding it necessary or advisable to increase 
the producti.an of eertain strategic metals with-
mtl disturbi,ng the price slructure the Govern-
ment set up the Metals lleserve Company to carry 
out a plan jointly arranged by the War Produc-
tion Board and the Office of Price Administra-
tion des(IJned to increase the output of such 
metals.'' 
\V e submit that the Court clearly erred in holding 
Pitlwr that there was a salt~ hy Petitioner, United ~tatet' 
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Nmelting l{efining and 1lining Company, or that pn~­
mium:s were prid to that Company when on~::> produee(l 
hy it had heen converted into the equivalent of money. 
:\. The Court erred in di:-;regarding Sedion tll-l-1, 
Utah Code Annotate(! l!J4:j, which define::> a ;,;ale and 
thereby nece;,;sarily limit:-; the meaning of the phrm;e, 
''the amount of money or its e(tuivalent adually 
rem~ive(l by the owner * * * from the sale of all 
orcs or metals during the calendar year ~, '~ *,'' 
as contained in Section 80-3-G6, Utah Code Annotated, 
194i}. 
\Vith re;,;poct to companies such as Petitioner, Com-
bined Metals Heduction Company, which sold its orc:s, 
the above section is, we submit, controlling. Moreover, as 
discussed in Petition for Rehearing filed by these Peti-
tioners with others in the Occupation rrax eat-ie;,;, (Com-
bined Metals Reduction Company and others v. State 
Tax Commission, No. 68ml to G87~l inclusive) the record 
shows that premium payments were received by some 
companies from 30 to 90 days before the recoverable 
metals wore available for sale and in other cases 30 days 
or more after the ores had been sold, and com;equently 
that not all premium payments could be related to ores 
produced in the year in which such premium payments 
were received. This in itself would negative the possi-
bility of including such premium payments in computing 
net proceeds. 
4. The Court erred in it,rnoring Section 80-3-1, de-
fining "value." 
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'l'his seetion defines "value" as: 
"'\'alue' aml 'full cash value' mean the amount 
at which the property would be taken in payment 
of a just debt due from a solvent debtor." 
N <nvhere iu its opinion does the Court refer to this 
statute, whid1 iK of first importance in a case in which, 
as thiK Honorable Court has said, 
''The only matter involved is the valuation for 
assessment purposes of the mine on January 4, 
1944.'' 
We respectfully submit that had the Court con-
sidered this statute it could not have held as it did that 
the value of a mine coul,d be arrive(l at hy including 
something paid to make possible the production of ores 
which would not otherwise have been "pay dirt." 
H could not seriously be urged that property would 
be taken in payment of a just debt from a solvent debtor 
at a value arrived at by including moneys paid by govern-
ment for a short time in a war emergency to secure the 
production of critically needed metals and which other-
wise could not have been profitably produced. 
5. 'l'he Court erred in disregarding the stipulated 
statement by Metals Heserve Company that, 
"Premium payments made by .Metals Re-
serve Company are not payments made by that 
cornpany or received by the Mining Company for 
tlte sale or conversion into rnoney or its equiva-
lent of any ores #.• ·~ "'." 
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"'l'o the cxtc~n t that any portion o [ such pre-
miums are taken by n state on ae<·ount of a TJI'O-
perty tax the purpos(' of l\letals Heserve Com-
Ilany in I)aying· the saHie \Yould be del'Pated ,-:- _ ... < :1:~ '' 
G. The Court erred in failing to construe the tax-
jng statulcs strictly against the defendant and ap])(~llant 
in each of the cases if doubt existed as to the intention 
of the Legi8lature. 
'l'his has been commented upon in Petition filed hy 
P<~titionen; here with others in the Occupation '!'ax cases. 
vVe submit there can be no <1uestion m; to the rule and 
further that even were the rule other than it is and were 
laxing 8tatute8 ordinarily as between the taxing body 
and the taxpayer to he construed in favor of the taxing 
body, they would never he so construed when there was 
a conflict in intere8t between the taxing body (Tooele 
County) and the United States of America. 
ln holding that premiums should he included in the 
tax base, the Court ignores the fact noted above from 
the statement approved by Metals Heserve Company, 
the ageney speaking for the United States, that, 
"To the extent that any portion of such pre-
miums are taken by a state on account of a pro-
perty tax, the purpose of Metals Reserve Com-
pany in paying the same would he defeated." 
IN CONCLUSION it is respectfully submitted that 
the Court in its Opinion clearly erred because: 
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1. Premium payments made by government to en-
courage and make post-1ible the production of sub-margin-
al ore::; whieh otherwise would not be "pay dirt" could 
not properly he induded as part of net proceeds for the 
purpose of valuing a mine. 
2. The inclusion of sueh prermums would clearly 
violate the Constitutional requirement as to uniformity 
of assessment and taxation. 
:-L 'l'he inclusion of sueh premiums was not within 
the contemplation of the Legislature when it enacted 
the net proceeds method of mine valuation. 
4. ln Case No. 6~)i31 the Court having determined 
as a l"act that there was no sale shown by the record and 
the partiet-1 having stipulated that premiums were paid 
on the basis of mine production records and from :30 to 
!)() dayt-1 before the recoverable metalt-1 are available for 
::;ale, the Court could not find either that premiums were 
paid U}Jon a sale or were paid when the ores had been 
converted into the equivalent of money. 
5. The Court may not disregard Section 81-1-1, 
Utah Code Annotated H)4i). 
G. '!'he Court may not disregard Section 80-3-1, 
Utah Code Annotated 1943. 
7. 'I' he Court erred in failing to construe the tax-
ing t-1tatutes strictly against the defendant and appellant 
in eaeh of tile pret-icnt ca!-iml if doubt existed as to the in-
tention of the Legislature. 
Hespectfully submitted, 
Hl'~ItBI<}Hrl' YAN DA11, 
Attorney for Hespondent, 
Combined l\1 etals Heduction Company 
CHENJ;}Y, .Jl<}NS.h}N, MARR & ~WILKINS 
Attorneys for Respondent, 
United ~Hates Smelting Refining 
and Mining Company. 
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